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The Wilson Case, The Alcan
Case and Contracts of
Employment: When is a
Variation not a Variation?
Mary Siddall
(Many thanks to Barry Hough, Associate Professor, Law Faculty, Southampton Institute for reading this article
and commenting upon it.)
Prior to this year, the legal conditions for bringing about a variation
in a contract of employment appeared to be quite clear; in fact, to have a
logical neatness about them which can be somewhat lacking in other,
murkier areas of employment law.
The rules went like this. A contract ofemployment is a contract like
any other. In accordance with common law principles, one party to the
contract cannot impose changes without the consent of the other.
Therefore, an employer who wishes to bring about a variation in the terms
of employment of an employee is required, either to obtain that
employee's consent, or to terminate the existing contract of employment
with the correct period of notice, whilst offering the new terms, to
commence immediately after the notice expires. (In effect, therefore, the
only means of introducing new terms in the absence of agreement was,
effectively, to dismiss the employee and start all over again with the new
contract).1
If an employer sought to impose a unilateral variation, again, the
options for the employee were clear(ish). The employee could continue to
work to the new terms, but under protest, and could bring a claim for
breach ofcontract to the county court, or a claim for breach of the Wages
Act 1986 to the industrial tribunal. Alternatively, he or she could treat the
imposed change as a repudiatory breach of contract, resign and claim
constructive dismissal.
See Rigby v Ferodo [1987] IRLR 516
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Sadly in my experience, employers (usually the party seeking to
bring about a change) were rarely impressed with the "logical neatness" of
these principles. I have often encountered great difficulty in persuading a
client that it is not possible for him or her to cut pay, or alter working
hours, or change a person's holiday entitlement simply by serving notice
to that effect. Once that point had been grasped, the client would express
horror at the notion that, in order to make the change, the employee may
have to be dismissed first. The lengthy letter of advice which followed,
setting out what could happen if (a) the change was imposed unilaterally
or (b) notice of termination was given, sent many a determined employer
running for cover.
Two recent cases have increased the employers' dilemma, while
dramatically strengthening the rights of employees in such a situation.
In Wilson and others v St Helens Borough Councif the Employment
Appeal Tribunal states that the established principles set out above will not
apply ifthe reason for the purported variation in terms is the transfer ofan
undertaking.
The Wilson case involved a school controlled by Lancashire County
Council. The County Council gave notice that it would withdraw its
support from the School on grounds of cost. St Helens Borough Council
agreed to assume control from the date of the County Council's
withdrawal. Thus, 76 ofthe 169 staff at the school were offered posts by
the Borough Council, but on different terms. These staff were made
redundant by the County Council on one day, and started work for the
Borough Council, under the new terms, the next.
Some months later, the Union acting for some of the staff wrote to
the Borough Council asking that the previous terms of employment be
restored. When this was refused, applications were made to the industrial
tribunal. The claims were dismissed, and the employees went to the EAT.
The argument of the employees was that their old terms of
employment with the County Council were absolutely protected following
the assumption ofcontrol by the Borough Council, by virtue ofRegulation
5(1) of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)
Regulations 1981, and by Article 3(1) of the European Directive 77/187
[1996]IRLR 320
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(the source of the UK regulations). Both provide that, where there has
been a transfer of an undertaking, all rights and obligations arising out of
any contract of employment in existence at the date of transfer are
transferred to the party taking over responsibility for the operation of the
undertaking.
Regulation 12 of the 1981 Regulations makes it clear that it is not
possible to contract out of the effect of Regulation 5.
The staff relied upon Regulation 12 and the European Court of
Justice case ofForeningen afArbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy's Dance
Hall A/S 3 as authority for the proposition that the rights conferred upon
employees by the Directive cannot be waived. Therefore, they argued, it
was not possible for them either to consent to the new terms or to affirm
them (by working under them) and the purported variation was ineffective.
The Employment Appeal Tribunal agreed. A variation in a contract
of employment, the Tribunal found, will be ineffective, even if made by
consent, if the reason for the variation is a transfer of the undertaking
in which the employee works.
The decision has caused great consternation among employers, and
delight amongst trade unions. It has been widespread practice for
incoming employers who acquire employees under the 1981 regulations
to agree alterations to their contracts ofemployment. Sometimes this will
be to harmonise the previous terms with those oftheir existing employees.
In other cases, a change in the terms of employment will be the whole
reason for the transfer in the first place: for instance, a business may try
to contract out part of its operation to reduce employment costs. Some of
the employees may be offered jobs by the contractor, but on a lower wage.
It is now open for an employee to accept the job offer, but then to claim
that his or her previous terms of employment apply and that the new
employer must pay the difference in wages.
The decision also makes it clear that an employer who sheds jobs
following a transfer will be able to rely upon the defence that the reason for
the dismissals was an "economic, technical or organisational reason
entailing changes in the workforce" (Regulation 8(2) of the 1981
Regulations); whereas the employer who tries to save jobs by persuading
[1988]IRLR 315
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the transferring employees to accept a lower rate of payor less
advantageous conditions cannot.
Further guidance on this issue may be obtained from the Court of
Appeal, to where the Wilson case is now headed; although frankly, now
that the association has been made, it is difficult to see how the principle
set out in Daddy's Dance Hall can be avoided.
A differently constituted EAT has had cause to look at this whole
issue again in the case ofMeade and Baxendale v British NuclearFuels. 4
Again, this was a claim by a person who had been dismissed by the
transferor and re-employed on less beneficial terms, which he consented
to. Two years later, he sought a declaration from the industrial tribunal
(under what is now section 11 ofthe Employment Rights Act 1996) as to
the terms and conditions of his employment. Like the applicants in
Wilson, he argued that any variation in these terms was ineffective because
of Regulation 5(1) of the TUPE regulations.
This time, the EAT held that a dismissal for a reason connected with
a transfer, although automatically unfair, was not a nullity. Therefore the
employment with the transferor had been effectively brought to an end and
the transferee was free to re-employ on any basis he chose. Wilson was
distinguished on the basis that the EAT had not considered the effect ofthe
dismissals and redundancy payments upon their fmding that the variations
were ineffective (even though it appears that the facts in Wilson were very
similar, ie all the teachers had been dismissed before accepting new
contracts). Nevertheless, the EAT went on to hold that, in the absence of
a dismissal, the principle set out in Wilson would hold good.
The Meade case therefore adds further uncertainty to an already
volatile area of the law. Employers can derive little comfort from it in
view of its similarity to the Wilson case. The Court of Appeal must now
decide which of the two decisions it prefers in cases where there is a pre-
transfer dismissal, as well as deciding the vital question of whether or not
the EAT's interpretation of the Daddy's Dance Hall case is correct.
In the meantime, many commercial clients are pulling out of deals,
especially in contracting-out situations where the impact of Wilson could
be catastrophic for one of the businesses concerned.
EAT, 24 July 1996, unreported at time ofwriting
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The A/can cases did not involve a transfer situation, but like Wilson
it provides employees with a valuable additional option, this time in cases
of attempts to vary the contract of employment unilaterally.
In A/can, the employers wished to introduce a new shift system.
They consulted with their employees over the proposed changes, but when
agreement was not forthcoming, the changes were imposed by a letter sent
to each one of them. The employees all responded in standard terms,
indicating that they would work the new system under protest, but that
they considered that they had been unfairly dismissed. All 61 employees
later brought claims for unfair dismissal to the industrial tribunal.
The tribunal's decision in favour ofthe applicants was upheld by the
Employment Appeal Tribunal. The EAT, relying on the case of Hogg v
Dover College,6 agreed that the unlawful imposition of a variation to the
terms of employment need not always be characterised as a potential
repudiatory breach, giving the employee the option whether to remain or
whether to resign and claim constructive dismissal. If substantial changes
are introduced without consent, this can amount to an effective withdrawal
of the original contract, ie a dismissal, entitling the employees to claim
unfair dismissal even if they continue to work for the employer.?
A/can, therefore, is a stark reminder to employers that they may be
heavily penalised if they try to impose changes in contractual terms upon
employees. The decision allows employees to "have their cake and eat
it", ie to keep their jobs but at the same time to bring a claim for unfair
dismissal. 8 Take the position of an employee whose contract has been
[1996] IRLR 327
[1990] ICR 39
7 The traditional view has always been that a repudiatory breach by the employer is effective to end the
contract of employment with immediate effect. Some doubt has been cast upon this by the line of case-
law of which Gunton v Richmond LBC [1980] IRLR 165 and Boyo v Lambeth London Borough
Council [1995] IRLR 50 are prime examples. Gunton raised the possibility that the employee was able
to elect whether or not to treat his or her employment as ended in face of a repudiatory breach by the
employer. However, the point has never really been settled. The case ofAlcan seems to offer an
interesting variation on this theme, offering the employee the chance both to treat himself or herself as
dismissed, but to remain in employment under the new terms.
An employer who has terminated a contract of employment in order to introduce new terms and
conditions may be able to show that the ensuing dismissal was fair for a "substantial reason". However,
it will not be enough for the employer to assert that there were good economic and business reasons for
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changed, without necessarily suffering a financial loss. Previously, he or
she may have considered a breach of contract claim, but decided that this
would not be worthwhile, because damages would be low or difficult to
quantify. If the change in working arrangements is substantial, the
employee will be able to claim unfair dismissal and recover, at least, the
basic award, even if there is no other loss. Likewise, an employee who
has suffered a severe cut in wages will not be confined to claiming the
difference between the old wage and the new: by claiming unfair
dismissal, he or she may claim a basic award or redundancy payment, pay
in lieu of notice plus the continuing loss of earnings.
For employers, the choice will be difficult. It is even clearer now
that a unilateral variation of employment is unlawful. If the changes are
imposed, that may lead to unfair dismissal claims. Yet the only legal way
of altering the employment contract, in the absence of consent, is by
dismissing the employee. That again may lead to the tribunal, and the
employer will only succeed in resisting claims if it can be demonstrated
that the dismissals were for a "fair" reason, for example, a compelling
economic or organisational reason why the changes must be brought in.
The employer may well feel that he is caught between the "devil and the
deep blue sea".
Conclusion
No matter what the law might say about both parties to a contract
having equal rights, in reality the notion of an employee "consenting" to
a change in a contract of employment is often a myth. Where the choice
is effectively "sign this agreement or lose your job" it is clear that
employer and employee do not have equal bargaining power. Nowadays,
it is a brave or rich employee who will face unemployment in order to
enforce his or her rights. This is a factor often relied upon by employers
when seeking to introduce changes in the workplace.
Both Alcan and Wilson go some way towards tilting the balance
towards the employee. If the case of Wilson is upheld by the Court of
making the changes - some evidence of the need to vary tenus must be demonstrated. See Banerjee v
City and East London Health Authority [1979] 2IRLR 147 and Chubb Fire Security Ltd v Harper
[1983] IRLR 311.
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Appeal, employers will fmd great obstacles to contracting out operations
in order to save labour costs. The case of Alcan means that employees
may not have to risk their livelihood in order to obtain a remedy against
their employer for imposing a drastic change in employment terms.
It seems right that an employee's contractual rights should be
entrenched as far as possible. It is also arguable that the practice of
offering employees (who might otherwise have been made redundant
following the transfer of the business where they work) detrimental terms
runs contrary to the whole purpose ofDirective 77/187, which is designed
to preserve their rights on a transfer.
The other side of the coin is worth looking at. There are occasions
where changes to outmoded terms ofemployment may be justified. There
are also situations (and our employment department here has been
involved in advising on several) where, if a business is not sold or
contracted out, all the employees will lose their jobs.
Will the law provide a workable situation to the perpetual problem
of balancing the rights ofthe employee against the economic needs of the
employer? That remains to be seen.
Mary Siddall
Paris Smith and Randall
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